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Introduction 
 
 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement 
Increased Pressure on European Trade Policy 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
After five years of intense negotiations, trade ministers of twelve Pacific Rim countries, 
including the United States, Canada, and Japan, have reached agreement on a compre-
hensive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Whether and when this agreement will come 
into effect depends above all on the ratification process in the US Congress. If ratified, 
the TPP will create the largest free trade zone worldwide. It will not only eliminate 
virtually all tariffs on trade and open up domestic markets extensively in the areas of 
agriculture and services, but also set binding minimum standards for trade and invest-
ment. The biggest “losers” under the TPP are the countries that are not part of the nego-
tiations – especially two of the world’s economic heavyweights: the EU and China. They 
are finding themselves increasingly on the defensive in trade policy. 
 
The nucleus of the TPP was formed by the 
countries of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, 
and Singapore (P4), which signed a multi-
lateral free trade agreement in 2005. After 
the United States, Australia, and Peru ex-
pressed interest in joining them in nego-
tiations, followed by Malaysia, Vietnam 
(2010), Mexico, Canada (2011), and Japan 
(2012), the TPP became the new prime focus 
of trade policy development in Asia. The 
agreement would represent 11.1% of the 
world’s population, 36.2% of global GDP, 
and 26.2% of global trade (2014). For the 
participating countries, the prospect of 
a large trans-Pacific free trade zone that 
would encompass the United States looked 
appealing and promising for a number of 
reasons. First, the TPP guarantees perma-
nent preferential access to the major im-
port markets of the Asia-Pacific. Second, 
the increased foreign trade and intensified 
international division of labor that stands 
to result from such an agreement will bring 
all of the signatories more income, employ-
ment, and growth. Third, the tariff reduc-
tions and common standards for rules of 
origin, customs processing, investments, 
and digital networking will allow more effi-
cient cross-border production and supply 
chains, which in turn will reduce costs and 
improve competitiveness. Fourth, the inte-
gration of developing and newly industrial-
ized countries into the TPP will demonstrate 
their capacity to connect the industrialized 
countries’ markets, and will also give these 
countries a decisive competitive edge when 
seeking to attract foreign investment. Fifth, 
the agreement sets comprehensive binding 
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trade standards that are designed to deepen 
economic integration of the signatory 
nations and further the development of the 
international trade system in general. Last 
but not least, in addition to the expected 
trade policy advantages there is also a geo-
political argument: the TPP will anchor the 
United States within the Asia-Pacific region 
and act as a trade and economic policy foun-
dation for US security alliances in Asia. The 
TPP demonstrates that the United States 
will not allow itself to be pushed out of the 
region by China’s ascent. 
The most important trade agreement 
since conclusion of the Uruguay round 
The TPP agreement can be regarded as his-
toric in its scope. First, the 12 countries 
participating in the TPP will comprise the 
largest free trade zone in the world. This 
is particularly significant because of the 
bilateral trade liberalization it will entail 
between economic heavyweights United 
States and Japan. Second, the agreement 
provides for sweeping opening of markets, 
trade liberalization measures, and stand-
ardizations. Third, the range of topics 
covered in the 30 chapters of negotiations 
is extremely broad. These include plans for 
a deep integration of markets. 
Under the TPP, tariffs and trade barriers 
on goods trade between the participating 
countries will be largely eliminated. Canada 
and the United States, however, have intro-
duced longer transitional periods and bind-
ing regional value-content requirements 
for the automotive and apparel sectors. 
Thus, the exemption from tariffs on motor 
vehicles will only apply if at least 45% of 
value added is generated in TPP member 
states. This percentage was the subject of 
intense debate up to the conclusion of the 
agreement, particularly because the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
included a 62.5% regional value content 
requirement. Discussion over the liberaliza-
tion of agricultural imports was even more 
heated. Japan ultimately accepted a sub-
stantial opening of its agricultural markets. 
Japan will substantially cut import tariffs on 
beef (from 38.5 to 9%) and pork (from 482 to 
50 Yen/kg). Canada succeeded in defending 
its protectionist agricultural system for dairy 
and poultry products, but made initial im-
port rate concessions to allow for imports 
representing 3.25% of Canada’s current an-
nual dairy production and 2.1% for chicken. 
The United States agreed to open its market 
to dairy and sugar imports, and has virtually 
eliminated tariffs on wood, wine, fruits and 
vegetables, sheep meat, fish, and seafood. 
As noted above, the TPP goes much 
further than classic trade liberalization. It 
also includes legally binding “behind-the-
border” measures: (1) In the cross-border 
trade in services, quantitative restrictions, 
requirements of local presence, and dis-
criminatory regulations and government 
procurement procedures are inadmissible 
under the agreement. These basic principles 
are applied in more precise detail in the 
TPP’s chapters on telecommunications, 
financial services, and e-commerce. A criti-
cal point from a European perspective is 
that centralized data storage outside a 
country’s sovereign territory can no longer 
be forbidden. (2) To prevent discrimination 
in trade, the TPP includes binding trans-
parency requirements in areas like customs 
processing, health, and plant protection 
(sanitary and phytosanitary measures, SPS), 
technical barriers to trade (TBT), and trade 
policy protection measures. (3) The usual 
rules requiring non-discriminatory policies 
and protections apply to investments. In the 
case of expropriation and discrimination, 
there is the option of investor-state dispute 
settlement proceedings. Procedural guaran-
tees and opt-out clauses (regarding applica-
tion of rules to the tobacco industry) are de-
signed to prevent abusive and disproportion-
ate legal suits. (4) To protect intellectual 
property rights, the agreement imposes 
formal legal standards and the duty to pro-
vide strong enforcement of these rules in 
standard business practice. For patent pro-
tection on controversial biological pharma-
ceutical products, there is a minimum of 
five years of data protection, far less than 
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the 12 years that the US pharmaceutical 
industry had been campaigning for. Geo-
graphical designations of origin can only 
be protected within the framework of trade-
mark protection, which is inadequate from 
a European perspective. (5) For government 
procurement, the TPP signatories will each 
provide a positive list of state institutions 
and companies that agree to TPP-wide gov-
ernment procurement procedures. (6) With 
regard to state-owned enterprises, the signa-
tory states agree to adhere to the principles 
of making commercial purchases based 
on commercial considerations and the prin-
ciples of non-discrimination, impartial 
oversight, non-subsidization, and transpar-
ency. (7) In the chapters of the TPP on labor, 
environment, and development, the signa-
tories pledge to uphold the ILO labor stand-
ards and the relevant international environ-
mental agreements and to adhere to com-
mon principles of economic development. 
These obligations contained in the agree-
ment have a number of aims: that Vietnam 
recognize trade union rights, that Malaysia 
reduce human trafficking, that Japan elimi-
nate harmful and unsustainable fisheries 
subsidies, and that all of the member states 
make concerted efforts to stop the trade in 
endangered species. (8) In addition to the 
aforementioned chapters on labor, environ-
ment, and development, other negotiation 
chapters stipulate the duties of implemen-
tation and ongoing cooperation in commit-
tees that still remain to be formed, namely: 
Human Capacity Building, Competition, 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Regu-
latory Consistency, Transparency and Anti-
Corruption, as well as Administrative and 
Institutional Provisions. (9) A state-state dis-
pute settlement mechanism may be invoked 
in all parts of the agreement including the 
areas of labor and the environment. Trade 
policy sanctions may be imposed if states 
fail to comply with binding rulings of the 
dispute settlement body. 
Ratification with a question mark 
The agreement will enter into force as soon 
as it has been ratified by all of the member 
states, or after two years if at least six coun-
tries representing 85% of the bloc’s GDP 
agree on its implementation. This means 
that approval by Japan and the United 
States – the two largest economies – will be 
crucial. While Japan’s parliament is expected 
to approve the trade agreement, ratifica-
tion by the United States is still in question. 
After all, the US Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA), a temporary power granted to the 
President, passed Congress in June with just 
a narrow majority and subject to 150 nego-
tiating objectives. The TPA empowers the 
president to negotiate trade accords that 
Congress can only approve or disapprove 
in full. This condition was necessary to ulti-
mately achieve agreement on the TPP since 
US trade partners would not have been 
prepared to make the concessions they did 
if there were a threat of further negotia-
tions in Congress. Now, however, the out-
comes of the negotiations on the TPP are 
being subjected to substantial critical scru-
tiny from congressional representatives, 
lobby groups, and the media. 
Even before the full text of the TPP was 
released, numerous leading US congres-
sional representatives and presidential 
candidates were skeptical, disappointed, 
or even openly opposed to the agreement. 
Hillary Clinton, who helped to initiate the 
TPP during her tenure as Secretary of State, 
has now moved to the side of the skeptics 
in her bid for the Democratic presidential 
nomination. On the other hand, important 
industrial and agricultural associations 
support the agreement. At the present 
point in time, it is uncertain how congress 
will vote on the issue. One thing is certain, 
however: Given the widespread opposition 
in the Democratic Party, the TPP has little 
chance without strong Republican support. 
Furthermore, the timing for the rest of the 
ratification process is extremely unfavora-
ble. A vote can take place only 90 days after 
the White House has sent official notice of 
intent to Congress to sign the agreement. 
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Congress will then need additional time 
to introduce the implementing bill in the 
House and Senate for approval, meaning 
that a vote cannot reasonably be expected 
before March 2016. By then, the crucial 
phase of voting in the presidential primaries 
will be underway. That will make it even 
more difficult for proponents to marshal 
the necessary political support to get the 
controversial agreement passed.  
Europe and China on the defensive 
Although it is difficult to predict how the 
rest of the ratification process will unfold, 
the likelihood of a trans-Pacific free trade 
agreement has increased significantly. The 
potential consequences of this agreement for 
the trade relations and trade policies of non-
participating countries – and for the multi-
lateral trade system as a whole – are vast. 
The market openings, liberalizations, and 
standardizations set out in the TPP agree-
ment do not apply to the countries that are 
not part of the negotiations. They will suffer 
substantial losses due to discriminatory 
trade diversion. These non-participating 
countries will come under pressure to either 
join the TPP free trade zone or to accept the 
new trade regulations unconditionally. This 
in turn could undermine the coherence 
and universality of the multilateral trade 
system as a whole. In Asia, the TPP would 
then probably develop an even stronger 
appeal above and beyond its already exist-
ing economic advantages. Korea, Thailand, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia 
have already indicated interest in joining 
the partnership. While its strict standards 
would make it impossible for many Asian 
countries to join at the current stage, the 
TPP could, in the longer term, advance to 
become the new “gold standard” of global 
trade and overshadow the soft regionalism 
prevalent in Asia. The Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN), which plans to 
launch a regional economic community on 
December 31, 2015, threatens to be split 
into members and non-members of the TPP. 
China’s accession to the TPP, on the other 
hand, is now considered possible in the 
medium term. This is due to the expected 
trade losses and the risk of being excluded 
from the ongoing development of new trade 
rules. China does have a range of other for-
eign trade policy options, however. It could 
choose to pursue China-centered regional 
integration regimes such as the ASEAN+6-
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship (RCEP), enhanced physical connectivity 
through infrastructure financing (AIIB), the 
maritime and terrestrial Silk Road initiative 
(OBOR), or intensified cooperation with the 
BRICS countries. 
The potential consequences of the TPP 
agreement could be significant for Euro-
pean trade, especially for exports to Japan. 
Furthermore, Brussels has had the dis-
illusioning experience that multilateral 
trade regulations effectively developed in 
negotiations elsewhere often turn out to be 
disadvantageous for the EU. For the Obama 
administration, the agreement with the 
Pacific states is undoubtedly the more im-
portant one for economic and geostrategic 
reasons. It should also be kept in mind that 
if the TPP does become a reality, this will 
substantially increase the costs of a failed 
free trade agreement between Canada, the 
United States, and Japan. What is at stake is 
not just compensation for the loss of market 
shares due to the TPP but also non-discrimi-
natory market access in the Pacific Rim. A 
Europe that fails to create a trans-Atlantic 
economic partnership while a similar part-
nership is taking shape in the Pacific will 
also be a less appealing partner for other 
countries. For Europe, this means that it 
has become all the more important to bring 
negotiations with the United States and 
Japan to a speedy conclusion. But even more 
important will be the translation of the 
large, trans-regional agreement into a global 
framework that is in conformity with 
the rules of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Negotiations with China over a bi-
lateral agreement should be initiated before 
the People’s Republic submits an applica-
tion to join the TPP. 
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